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of police power comes about when the property is restricted for
public benefit, as opposed to public harm.
MARK W. SCHNEIDER
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
I. WATER LAW-DIFFUSE SURFACE WATERS
The most radical change in the law affecting real property
rights to come out of the August 1974 Term of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was the new water law set down in State v.
Deetz.1 The State of Wisconsin on a public trust theory brought
action against an individual property owner, a development
association, and a town to enjoin them from permitting depos-
its of sand and dirt to accumulate in Lake Wisconsin and on
adjacent roads. The deposit of debris was caused by erosion
which resulted from the construction of roads and clearing of
land for housing. The State also sought forfeitures under the
statute for obstruction of navigable waters2 and for deposit of
deleterious substances in state waters.3
The trial court had dismissed the State's complaint in reli-
ance on the common enemy doctrine which gave a property
owner the right to cause diffuse surface water to be diverted
from his land without regard for any damage which it might do
to neighboring property. The supreme court, after reexamining
the common enemy doctrine in light of other recent decisions
of the court relating to land use and water, announced the
adoption of a new rule governing diffuse surface waters-the
reasonable use rule of the second Restatement of the Law of
Torts.' The case was remanded to the trial court for a determi-
nation of whether the utility of the conduct outweighed the
gravity of the harm caused under the rule of reasonable use.
I1. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
In Schwanz v. Teper the supreme court addressed the ques-
1. 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1975). This case will not be discussed in any detail
here because of its extensive treatment in the recent article Comment, Wisconsin
Strives to Minimize Conflicts Over the Use of Water, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 145 (1976).
2. Wis. STAT. §§ 30.12(1)(a), 30.15(1) and (3) (1971).
3. Wis. STAT. § 29.29(3) (1971).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), § 826 (Tent.
Draft No. 18, 1972), § 827 (Tent. Draft 17, 1971), § 828 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
5. 66 Wis. 2d 157, 223 N.W.2d 896 (1975).
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tion of whether a debtor-owner of a duplex, who lives in one
half and rents the other half, may claim the protection of the
homestead exemption statute' for the rental income as well as
for the part of the house he occupies. The court also clarified
whether the trial court had power under this statute to hold in
escrow the proceeds from the sale of an exempt homestead so
long as the debtor intends to purchase another homestead dur-
ing the two year period of protection allowed under the statute.
First, the supreme court determined that the public policy
of affording protection to a debtor's homestead has resulted in
a liberal construction of the exemption statute in favor of the
debtor.7 Second, the court found the rule allowing a judgement
debtor to dispose of the proceeds of a homestead sale in what-
ever manner he pleases to be well settled law.8 In addition to
the case law, the court cited Wisconsin Statute section 266.121
which prohibits the attachment of exempt property. The com-
bination of these factors led to the court's conclusion that a
trial court may not order exempt property to be held by the
clerk of court. Since the plaintiff's duplex was held to be an
exempt homestead, the trial court erred in ordering the pro-
ceeds from the sale held in escrow.
On the question of whether rental income from the leased
portion of an exempt homestead is included in the statutory
protection, the court found the general rule to be that such
income is exempt, so long as it is not rent from a business
6. Wis. STAT. § 272.20(1) (1971):
Homestead exemption definition. (1) An exempt homestead as defined in s.
990.01(14) selected by a resident owner and occupied by him shall be exempt
from execution, from the lien of every judgment and from liability for the debts
of such owner to the amount of $10,000, except mortgages, laborers', mechanics'
and purchase money liens and taxes and except as otherwise provided. Such
exemption shall not be impaired by temporary removal with the intention to
reoccupy the premises as a homestead nor by the sale thereof, but shall extend
to the proceeds derived from such sale to an amount not exceeding $10,000,
while held, with the intention to procure another homestead therewith, for 2
years.
This statute was amended by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 168 to raise the value of the home-
stead interest protected from $10,000 to $25,000.
7. See Northwestern Securities Co. v. Nelson, 191 Wis. 580, 211 N.W. 798 (1927).
8. See Kopf v. Engelke, 240 Wis. 10, 1 N.W.2d 760 (1942).
9. Wis. STAT. § 266.12 (1971):
What may be attached; how attached. All the property of the defendant, not
exempt from execution, may be attached. Personal property shall be attached
as upon an execution and the provisions respecting the levy of an execution
thereon shall be applicable to an attachment.
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homestead."0 The court examined cases relying on this rule
from three neighboring states," and concluded that although
Wisconsin's exemption statute does not specifically include the
rental income, it would be in keeping with public policy favor-
ing preservation of the debtor's homestead to so interpret the
statute. The trial court's judgment was reversed on both issues,
and the cause remanded for payment to the plaintiff of the
money held in escrow by the clerk of court.
III. UNEXECUTED JUDGMENT LIEN AND JOINT TENANCY
In Northern State Bank v. Toal,' - the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had its first occasion to look at Wisconsin Statute section
700.24 since its enactment by the 1971 state legislature:
700.24 Death of a joint tenant; effect of liens. A real estate
mortgage, a security interest under ch. 409, or a lien under
ss. 45.37(12), 71.13(3)(b), 72.86(2), chs. 49 or 289 on or against
the interest of a joint tenant does not defeat the right of
survivorship in the.event of the death of such joint tenant,
but the surviving joint tenant or tenants take the interest
such deceased joint tenant could have transferred prior to
death subject to such mortgage, security interest or statutory
lien.'3
The court ruled that the statute had not changed the case
law with regard to judgments docketed but not executed. Such
judgments are not included among the liens preserved by the
statute in cases of death of a joint tenant. The court cited Musa
v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co.'4 for the proposition that the mere
docketing of a judgment without execution does not sever the
joint tenancy. Since the debtor's interest during his life is sub-
ject to the right of survivorship, no interest remains after his
death upon which an execution could operate and the lien is
extinguished. 5
10. 66 Wis. 2d at 165, 223 N.W.2d at 900 (1975), citing 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 70
(1944); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 897 (1955).
11. Morgan & Hunter v. Rountree, 88 Iowa 249, 55 N.W. 65 (1893); Bartold v.
Lewandowska, 304 Mich. 450, 8 N.W.2d 133 (1943); Umland v. Holcombe, 26 Minn.
286, 3 N.W. 341 (1879).
12. 69 Wis. 2d 50, 230 N.W.2d 153 (1975).
13. Wis. STAT. § 700.24 (1973). This statute is a re-enactment of former Wis. STAT.
§ 230.455 (1971) with minor changes in phraseology. The prior statute had also not
been interpreted by the Wisconsin court.
14. 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1937).
15. For further discussion of the effect of Wis. STAT. ch. 700 on joint tenancy, see
19761
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IV. INTER Vivos GIFT OF BANK DEPOSIT
Estate of Schreiber'6 is a relatively uncomplicated case
dealing primarily with the sufficiency of the evidence to estab-
lish an inter vivos gift after the donor has died. What makes
the case of more than routine interest might be summed up as
a riddle: When is a bank deposit not a bank deposit? Answer:
When it is a partnership interest.
Barbara Schreiber was given her husband's partnership in-
terest in a large shopping center project just before he died. The
decedent had left a will which had been executed prior to his
marriage to Barbara which did not include her. The trial court
had determined that there had been no gift of the partnership
interest; and therefore, the interest was properly included in
the inventory of the estate. On appeal, the supreme court held
that the gift to Barbara of all of the personal property of the
partnership had been proven by the great weight and clear
preponderance of the evidence.
Although both the trial court and the supreme court had
found bank deposits to be part of the partnership property,
they differed on whether a gift of the property had been effec-
tuated. The trial court had ruled against the validity of the gift
of the deposits, basing its decision upon the fact that Robert
had not made any formal written assignment of the deposits to
Barbara. The trial court found this to indicate a specific lack
of donative intent, since Robert had been free to withdraw
money from any of the accounts up until the day of his death.
In support of the trial court's finding, the bank, as personal
representative of Robert's estate, relied upon Wisconsin Stat-
ute section 241.25:
Transfer of bank book to be in writing. No gift, sale, as-
signment or transfer of any saving fund bank book bearing
evidence of bank deposits or of any interest in the deposits
represented thereby, shall be valid unless the same shall be
in writing and the same or a copy thereof delivered to the
bank issuing such bank deposit book."
In a prior case,'" the supreme court had stated the purpose
Comment, Concurrent Ownership: Joint Tenancy & Tenancy in Common Under
Chapter 700, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 321 (1972).
16. 68 Wis. 2d 135, 227 N.W.2d 917 (1975).
17. Wis. STAT. § 241.25 (1971).
18. Estate of Detjen, 34 Wis. 2d 46, 55, 148 N.W.2d 745, 749 (1967).
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of the statute to be protection of the bank before it received
written notice of a gift of the savings deposit. In this case,
however, the court concentrated solely on the issue of whether
there had been a valid delivery of the bank deposits and ig-
nored the question of whether the bank was entitled to rely on
the statute for its own protection against possible multiple
claims to the same deposit. One can only surmise as to the
court's reasoning-the bank here presumably no longer needed
the protection of the statute because the depositor was dead
and the estate was being probated under the supervision of the
trial court.
The court then addressed the remaining question of
whether the gift had been completed by a valid delivery of the
bank deposits to Mrs. Schreiber. Without discussing any
theory of constructive or symbolic delivery, the court simply
concluded that the bank books were a part of the partnership
property and that the partnership interest had been a valid
gift. Mrs. Schreiber's assumption of dominion over the partner-
ship property after the time of her husband's expressed intent
to give her the property completely disposed of the delivery
issue.
This case in no way clarifies the nebulous area of gift law.
While it seems to stand for the proposition that an excess of
donative intent will suffice for a lack of delivery, the court
insists that all four elements of a gift must be proved. The court
lists these elements as: (1) intention to give on the part of the
donor; (2) delivery, actual or constructive, to the donee; (3)
termination of the donor's domination over the subject of the
gift; and (4) dominion in the donee. 9
The court's interpretation of the statute,"0 which it views as
designed to protect the bank, is highly unsatisfactory. On its
face the statute is clear that there is only one way to make a
valid gift of bank deposits; that is, in writing with a copy deliv-
ered to the bank. Although in this case the bank does not
subject itself to multiple liability from the donor/depositor's
demand of the money on deposit since the donor is dead, there
remains the claim of the beneficiaries, the successors in interest
of the donor. The bank still has an interest in avoiding a claim
of liability by the beneficiaries, and it would seem that the
19. 68 Wis. 2d at 145, 227 N.W.2d at 922.
20. Wis. STAT. § 241.25 (1971).
1976]
beneficiaries also have a right to rely on the statute for the
protection of their interest in the deposits.
However disquieting this decision, it is Wisconsin law.
Banks and beneficiaries alike are left without statutory protec-
tion in the case of gifts of bank deposits where those gifts are
sustainable with clear and convincing evidence of strong dona-
tive intent. There need be no possession of the bank deposit
book by the donee nor any writing indicating the gift delivered
to the bank so long as the bank deposits are part of a larger
interest, a partnership interest, given as a valid gift to the
donee.
BARBARA BECKER
TAXATION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in its 1974 term, was con-
fronted with very few tax questions. Of those encountered,
three are especially noteworthy. The first is significant for a
Wisconsin resident who invests as a limited partner in a part-
nership which is not engaged in business in Wisconsin, the
second for a Wisconsin manufacturer who contracts with the
federal government, and the third for a Wisconsin landowner
who is concerned with the methods used to determine real es-
tate assessments.
I. INCOME TAXATION
Generally, income or loss is included in one's Wisconsin
adjusted gross income if the situs of the income or loss is Wis-
consin.' Determining the situs of income is controlled by Wis-
consin Statute section 71.07(1).2 In that statute, various cate-
gories of income or loss are described, and the situs of each
category is specified.3
1. Wis. STAT. §§ 71.02(2)(e), 71.05(1), and 71.07 (1973).
2. Wis. STAT. § 71.07(1) was amended by Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 125. The 1971 amend-
ment applies to tax returns for calendar year 1973 or the corresponding fiscal year and
years thereafter. For income years prior to 1973, the 1969 statute should be used. It
must be noted that although the 1969 statute was applied in Sweitzer v. Department
of Revenue, 65 Wis. 2d 235, 222 N.W.2d 662 (1974), the principal case in this Income
Taxation section of the Term of Court, the outcome of the case would not have been
affected by the 1971 amendment, the bulk of which affects corporations, not individu-
als.
3. Wis. STAT. § 71.07(1) (1973):
